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Abstract: 
 
I conducted a multiple case study to assess the role of small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) in global governance – the collective rule-making and rule-implementation among 
public and private actors on a global scale. Results of a sample of ‘best-practice’ SMEs in the 
textile industry suggest that companies, which are embedded in global supply chains and thus 
exposed to operating in zones of weak social and environmental regulation, are accepting 
‘political’ responsibilities. They engage for instance in defining and enforcing labour 
standards for factory workers, a task once regarded as a genuine government responsibility. 
The SMEs of the sample show high awareness for global governance challenges; they stress 
the need to engage in collective action to counter their small individual impact, and have 
implemented a range of organizational procedures to engage in political CSR. In sum, 
findings suggest that global governance is not something just for larger companies. In fact, the 
analyzed SMEs are even more advanced in engaging in global governance than many MNEs. 
From the empirical findings, I deduct several propositions to be tested in further quantitative 
studies. 
 
Keywords: case study, global governance, multinational enterprises (MNEs), political CSR,  
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), textile industry 
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Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises as Political Actors in  
Global Governance – Evidence from the Textile Industry 
 
The protection of human rights, socially acceptable working conditions and 
environmental sustainability in many developing countries and emerging markets is at stake. 
In many locations around the world, respective rules and regulation are often absent, weak or 
not enforced by legislative authorities (Scherer et al., 2006). It has been discussed on a 
theoretical level how the responsibility to approach such issues could be shared between 
public (governments) and private (business firms) actors (Matten and Crane, 2005; Scherer 
and Palazzo, 2007; Scherer and Palazzo, 2011). Several authors have shown that business 
firms are already actively engaging in so-called ‘political’ corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), which includes tasks once regarded as the sole responsibility of governments 
(Baumann and Scherer, 2010; Scherer et al., 2006; see Margolis and Walsh, 2003). Thereby, 
companies are accepting an active ‘political’ role, in addition to their apparent economic role 
in global governance - referring to the collective rule-making and rule-implementation on a 
global scale that combines the efforts of public actors and private actors (Scherer et al., 2006). 
These companies are no more just addressees of regulation, but also authors of rules with 
public impact, while being embedded in democratic processes of defining these rules and 
tackling global political challenges (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007, p. 1098). In this study, I refer to 
the notion of CSR as an umbrella term for the debate about the relationship between business 
and society. The terms ‘political CSR’ and global governance are used to make an explicit 
reference to the additional global dimension of corporate responsibility which occurs along a 
company’s globally embedded supply chain1.  
In practice, business firms actively participate in the United Nations Global Compact 
(UNGC), the largest (political) CSR initiative in the world with more than 5.000 participants, 
                                                 
1
 The term CSR does not imply that only incorporated firms have responsibilities to society. In this article it is 
refrained from promoting a new, probably more SME-specific term, as this would only add complexity to the 
myriad of terms already in use. Moreover, there are examples of articles that have applied CSR to SMEs without 
any loss of clarity (e.g. Jenkins, 2004, 2006; see Preuss & Perschke, 2010). 
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which seeks to engage companies along 10 universal principles of human rights, labour 
standards, environmental responsibility and anti-corruption. Other firms chose for instance to 
participate in more specific multistakeholder-initiatives (MSI), such as the Fair Wear 
Foundation (FWF) to promote fair working standards in the textile industry or the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC) to promote sustainable forestry. Also, many business firms decide 
to participate in working groups at the industry level, e.g. to establish a standardized approach 
to environmental protection. 
As much as multinational enterprises (MNEs), which in most of the prevalent 
literature are the implicit or explicit object of study, a significant number of small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SME) - in this study referred to as a company with less than 250 
employees (EC, 2003) - is embedded in global value- and production chains and therefore 
operating in zones of potentially weak or absent regulation (Schwab, 2008). Either as 
suppliers to other MNEs, or with own activities in countries with weak governance. Such 
SMEs are, independent of their size, multinational companies (though often having another 
legal status than ‘corporation’) as well and are exposed to the same issues as large MNEs, for 
instance human rights abuses, worker rights violations, environmental pollution or corrupt 
authorities. Also, half of the UNGC participants are SMEs, and the majority of the members 
of the FWF are medium-sized enterprises (www.unglobalcompact.org; www.fairwear.org). 
However, little empirical research has been conducted that explores and discusses the 
role of SMEs as political actors in global governance and how they embed and organize the 
necessary mechanisms at an operational level (Spence, 2007). Most studies do not 
differentiate between MNEs and SMEs. MNEs are usually considered when looking at ‘best 
practice’ examples and it has even been suggested that larger firm size implies a higher 
provision of CSR attributes (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). Though, SMEs approach 
(political) CSR differently than MNEs with a not necessarily inferior impact on society and 
there is no evidence that  they are less able to deal with challenges of global governance or 
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less effective in implementing practices of political responsibility (Scherer, 2006; Wickert, 
2010). SMEs have different organizational structures than MNEs, such as a usually less 
formal and more personal way of doing business, a different ownership-structure as a 
potential driver for engaging in global governance, and different triggers and obstacles they 
might face, for instance due to limited company size and impact, or financial and human 
resources (see e.g. Jorgensen and Knudsen, 2006; von Weltzien Hoivik and Melè, 2009; see 
also Wickert, 2010). Hence, the already ambiguous concept of political CSR and its 
organizational implementation remains even more unclear when differentiating after firm size. 
Theoretical concepts and recommendations for practice remain abstract and have not yet 
engaged sufficiently in analyzing the organizational structures in place and necessary to cope 
with such responsibilities at the firm level.  
Several scholars have thus called for qualitative, case-based research rather than 
further quantitative studies in this highly unexplored field of political CSR and global 
governance in general, and for a more explicit analysis of SMEs in particular (Spence, 2007; 
Rasche, 2009; Baumann and Scherer, 2010). Such qualitative case study approaches involve 
the exploration of a topic or issue in depth, with emphasis on seeking information from actors 
who are experiencing or are involved in the issue (see Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2003).  
The purpose of this study is to fill these voids as outlined above. Therefore, the key 
research objective is to explore with systematically collected empirical evidence of primary 
interview-based data whether some SMEs have already been actively accepting a role in 
global governance, why and how they understand and embed political CSR at the 
organizational level and what the triggers and obstacles for their engagement are. For this 
reason, I am not focussing on identifying a gap between commitment and actual practices, 
which have often been the focus of studies about MNEs (see e.g. Baumann and Scherer, 
2010); rather, I attempt to ‘showcase’ whether a so-called political role of SMEs actually 
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exists in the first place. Therefore, in this early attempt to explore SME practices in political 
CSR, it renders useful to consider companies which seem likely to be best-practices in the 
first place. This explorative study is a necessary first step to establish a theoretical, but 
empirically supported basis for generating propositions about SMEs role in political CSR.  
The analysis builds on a theoretically embedded conceptual framework of global 
governance developed by Wickert (2010). This framework is based on a theoretical 
discussion about the role of SMEs in global governance and the concept of social justice 
theory and ‘social connection’ (Young, 2004; 2006). I outline along three dimensions of 
connection, power, and skills & capacities how SMEs can on the one hand theoretically 
systematize political CSR at an operational level and on the other hand provide a tool for 
assessing and thus comparing the engagement of different SMEs. These dimensions grasp 
how SMEs are generally aware of issues of global governance, framed along the 10 UNGC 
principles and how they feel connected to them; how SMEs are engaging in collective action 
and formal or informal networks with other stakeholders; and how they are approaching 
political CSR in their company culture, daily practices, involving employees and how 
transparently they are disclosing or willing to disclose their activities, respectively. 
For the case study, I have selected seven SMEs with international operations and a 
homebase in Switzerland. All companies of the sample are in the textile industry. Thus, the 
initial exposure to issues of global governance (e.g. human rights problems in the supply 
chain) was high and allowed exploring ‘rich’ cases. The same cultural, legal as well as 
sectoral context furthermore allowed a more rigorous comparison between the companies.  
Findings suggest that these SMEs all demonstrate a high awareness of issues along the 
UNGC principles; rather than neglecting the acceptance of an active role in global governance 
due to their limited size and influence, all companies have strongly emphasized the need to 
collectively address political CSR, e.g. by participating in industry associations or MSIs like 
the UNGC or the FWF. Moreover, they have pointed out that their small size makes it 
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relatively easier to spread awareness among employees and influence daily practices at the 
company level. I found evidence that the exposure to global governance issues in the supply 
chain, caused by the type of industry and business model, as well as the ownership structure 
of a company are important factors that trigger engagement, in addition to mere size. Given 
the practices of the SMEs, in particular those which have been classified into the strategic and 
civil stage, it seems wrong to predominantly consider MNEs for best-practices and as the 
innovators in the CSR debate. Rather, MNEs should pay more attention for SME best 
practices, for instance regarding employee involvement or transparency. 
I will elaborate this study in four sections. The following section develops the 
theoretical background by building the context from the extant literature, in which this study 
is embedded, and illustrates the conceptual model which has guided the empirical analysis. 
Next, I describe the research methodology. In the subsequent section, I present and analyse 
the findings of the case study. Finally, I move to a discussion section where general results 
and several propositions as a suggestion for further study are developed. The concluding 
section points to limitations of this study and suggests avenues for further research.  
 
Global Governance and an Ideal Conceptualization of Political CSR 
The research context of this study is framed around the emerging political role being 
attributed to transnationally operating business firms (Scherer et al., 2006). As I have argued, 
both MNEs and many SMEs are operating globally and are thus exposed to global governance 
issues. In such cases, businesses are - deliberately or not - able to exploit regulatory gaps and 
take advantage of low or non-existing social and environmental standards when moving 
supply chain activities to offshore locations or coutnries with low levels of respective 
regulation (Scherer and Smid, 2000).  
Consequently, those companies whose business conduct (i.e. their sourcing, 
production or their sales) goes beyond the reach of national regulation in general, and those 
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who do business in zones of conflict or of weak governance in particular, are increasingly 
confronted with new demands of civil society to accept ‘political’ responsibilities. In this 
sense, political CSR implies an active linking of “[…] corporate decision making processes to 
civil society discourses, and shifting corporate attention and money to societal challenges 
beyond immediate stakeholder pressure” (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007, p. 1115). Accordingly, 
corporate actors administer citizenship rights (Matten and Crane, 2005) and are not only 
addressees of (self)regulation, but also authors of rules with public impact. Furthermore, they 
have to submit their activities to public scrutiny and democratic control in order to achieve 
legitimacy for their political actions (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006). Such a political role of 
private businesses is based on the normative ‘social connection model’ of political 
responsibility, in which agents who contribute by their actions to the structural processes that 
produce injustice have responsibilities to work to remedy these injustices (Young, 2004; 
2006). Hence, a ‘political responsibility’ refers to activities “in which people organize 
collectively to regulate or transform some aspects of their shared social conditions, along with 
the communicative activities in which they try to persuade one another to join such collective 
actions or decide what direction they wish to take“ (Young, 2004, p. 377). Not the direct 
connection, but the structural, ‘social’ connection of an agent creates responsibility; that is, 
“the scope of an agents moral obligation extends to all those whom the agent assumes in 
conducting his or her activity” (Young, 2004, p. 371). 
Wickert (2010) has discussed the role of SMEs in global governance on a theoretical 
level and developed a conceptual framework with ideal levels of political CSR which allows 
systematically structuring and assessing global governance engagement of SMEs. Following 
Yin’s (1994; 2003) argument that explorative case studies should be based on a theoretical 
foundation, I first introduce and then apply this conceptual framework as a guiding concept to 
conduct the empirical study and to define priorities to be explored. In the analysis, I then 
compared the collected data with the framework as a reference point.  
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The conceptual framework comprises of a two-dimensional matrix: a vertical ‘axis’ 
which illustrates different stages of political CSR, i.e. the more or less comprehensive extent 
to which an SME is engaged in global governance; and a horizontal ‘axis’ which illustrates 
the different dimensions where global governance is exercised (see appendix 1).  
The stage-axis 
The different stages of engagement in political CSR are structured into five ideal-type 
levels, namely denial, compliance, managerial, strategic and civil (see Zadek, 2004; Maon et 
al., 2010). While later stages illustrate a more advanced approach than earlier ones, they are 
subsequent, i.e. later stages include the elements of earlier ones. However, a company may 
show activities which fit into the last stage (e.g. engaging in MSIs to advance self-regulation), 
but may not have implemented all UNGC principles in a strategic way, i.e. the stage might be 
distinct for different dimensions (Wickert, 2010).  
Notably, this framework seeks to structure the global (political) dimension of CSR, 
rather than corporate responsibility in general. Therefore, it does not capture activities of 
responsible business practice or philanthropy at a local level, such as employee well-being or 
waste-recycling measures at the company’s headquarters or donations to charity initiatives in 
the home community. 
On the left end of the spectrum, the defensive stage describes companies that are 
refusing any political responsibility in the respective arena of their operations. SMEs are 
likely to justify this by the argument that their small size and limited resources prohibit any 
form of engagement and that it should be left to MNEs. There is neither rule-implementation 
nor rule-making concerning the issues addressed by the UNGC. 
The second compliance stage describes a legalistic view of CSR. For SMEs, 
compliance can signify an implicit culture of ‘we act according to the law’. There is no rule-
making and rather law-implementation (legal compliance) than voluntary rule-
implementation. A compliance approach might be appropriate for SMEs (and other businesses 
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alike) if they operate in zones where national regulation is in place and well enforced (e.g., in 
their European home country). However, in particular in developing countries or emerging 
markets, this is not always the case; therefore, political CSR is considered to ‘start’ in the 
following stage. 
In the managerial stage, SMEs begin to consider specific issues of political CSR in 
their daily business. They may e.g. start buying raw materials, which are certified by common 
fair trade labels or sustainability standards. This way, SMEs aim to make sure that labour 
standards or environmental responsibility are respected by their suppliers. In other words, 
some elements of rule implementation are applied in specific parts of the value creation. 
In the strategic stage, a company integrates political CSR in its core business 
strategies. In addition to for instance having an anti-child labour policy, the company also has 
integrated all other UNGC principles into their business processes and supply chain in a 
strategic way. SMEs might have developed a business model, which builds on a sustainable 
product, or they have e.g. integrated only purchasing certified materials into their entire 
business operations. Strategic then refers to integrated, rather than selective rule-
implementation, but not yet rule-making, i.e. participating in dialogue with stakeholders 
proactively, and encouraging others to do so as well.  
The definition of the final stage - civil - corresponds with an ideal understanding of 
political CSR. Thus, it includes both ideal-level rule-making and ideal-level rule-
implementation, whereas earlier stages only refer to rule-implementation. The civil stage is 
characteristic for companies who promote broad industry participation for engaging in 
political CSR. In this stage, the communicative dimension of political CSR is fully integrated 
into the business model, i.e. not only caring for specific issues along one’s supply chain, but 
also promoting others to do so and legitimizing one’s actions by entering into 
multistakeholder dialogues. 
 
 12 
The dimensions-axis 
The dimensions-axis is developed by first providing a theoretical argument why SMEs 
are connected to global governance in general and how and where this requires systematic 
engagement in political CSR.  
A central requirement for the development of such a conceptual framework is to 
counter the fear that political responsibility makes everyone responsible for everything. 
Different actors have different kinds of responsibilities in relation to particular issues of 
injustice, and some arguably have a greater degree of responsibility than others, depending on 
the social connection to a specific type of injustice, e.g. workers rights violations (Young, 
2006, p. 126). Also, in particular when considering SMEs and MNEs, actors have different 
amounts of resources, and they might face different levels of constraints (Young, 2006). To 
define the limits of political responsibility, actors must understand it as a ‘task’ responsibility 
which arises along a company’s core business operations and supply chain (Young, 2004, p. 
384). Derived from the argumentation of the social connection logic, Young proposes to 
systematize political responsibility of specific actors along different dimensions of reasoning 
that guide behaviour (2004; 2006). Tasks are divided according to the dimensions of 
connection, power and skills & capacities. These three dimensions constitute the conceptual 
framework, for which observable indicators are subsequently developed (see appendix 1). As 
informality in processes is a key feature of the organizational structure of SMEs (see e.g. 
Jenkins, 2004; Moore and Spence, 2006; Russo and Perrini, 2009), the definitions of the sub-
dimensions must be based on criteria which allow an informal handling and implementation 
of (political) CSR practices.  
1) Connection captures the general awareness of global governance related issues. I 
argue that the 10 principles of the UNGC (see annex) comprehensively define those issues 
which are relevant in terms of global governance and are thus used as a reference point. Also, 
this dimension captures the awareness of a company regarding its social connection to such 
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issues along its supply chain. The influence of SME owner-managers in particular regarding 
awareness of global governance issues and social connection is considered crucial for this 
dimension. Accordingly, connection consists of the sub-dimensions issue awareness and 
social connection  
2) Power captures the specific degree of potential or actual power and influence of 
actors to engage collectively and enter into joint efforts of problem solving with external 
actors such as peer companies and other stakeholders in MSIs or similar network structures. 
The need for collective action and engagement in networks due to low individual influence of 
SMEs is considered crucial in this dimension. Accordingly, power consists of the sub-
dimensions collective action in general and network involvement in particular. 
3) Skills & capacities captures the internal embeddedness of political CSR in the 
mindset of the organization’s members (company culture), in its specific daily practices and 
processes such as procurement, production, marketing, etc. and the involvement of employees 
in these processes as well as the way how this information is transparently disclosed and 
communicated to an external public. The predominantly informal nature of SME’s internal 
organization, regarding culture and involvement of employees and a pragmatic, less 
standardized approach to disclosing information is considered a key characteristic of this 
dimension (see Wickert, 2010). 
 
Research Design and Methods 
The present research design might best be described as theory elaboration (see Lee et al., 
1999) in that it seeks to elaborate theoretical links not previously addressed in the respective 
literature. For example, previous studies on the role of private actors in global governance 
have not distinguished between firm size (or have only analysed large firms) and structural 
influences, such as agency relations between principal (e.g. owner of a firm) and agent (e.g. 
manager of a firm) that is significantly different relative to firm size and ownership (see e.g. 
 14 
Baumann and Scherer, 2010; Preuss and Perschke, 2010; Russo and Perrini, 2009). Thus, I 
attempt to ‘clarify and redirect’ theory on the specific role of SMEs in global governance in a 
way that seeks to find out particular attributes of engagement which are caused or influenced 
by the specific characteristics of a SME. 
The case study approach is defined as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates particular 
instances of a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, which might possibly 
change over time; and including multiple sources of evidence as well as rich empirical data’ 
(Yin, 1994; 2003). It represents a useful method when relatively little is known of an area of 
research or if a ‘fresh perspective’ is needed (Eisenhardt, 1989). Accordingly, this approach 
ensures ‘methodological fit’ (Edmondson and McManus, 2007: 1161). I use a multi-case 
approach, which on the one hand allows drawing more robust conclusions from the case 
findings than a single case study and on the other hand provides a stronger basis for theory 
elaboration (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). The purpose of this research was thus to gain a 
deeper understanding of the respective processes and their meaning within SMEs. Therefore, 
a qualitative approach was taken, keeping the sample size small in order to attain information 
richness. 
Case Selection 
I applied ‘theoretical’, rather than ‘random’ sampling (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) for the 
selection of cases and sought to chose rather ‘extreme’ cases in terms of visible and existing 
global governance engagement in order to allow studying data-rich cases, as recommended by 
Eisenhardt (1989; see also Siggelkow, 2007). I used publicly available secondary data, such 
as company websites, media- and third-party information (e.g. published by NGOs) to select 
companies that represented a ‘degree of responsibility’ which appeared considerably above 
average, and I considered them as innovators, rather than laggards in terms of political CSR. 
Given the limited number of available cases which could be studied to answer my research 
questions it made sense to choose cases in which the issues of interest are most transparently 
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observable, i.e. to select cases which already seem to be active in political CSR to a certain 
extent.  
Singling out one industry and one common cultural and legislative context, namely the 
textile industry and Switzerland, allowed controlling for extraneous variation. This industry 
and the apparent connection to production sites in countries of weak governance provided 
data-rich and interesting cases. The textile industry was one of the first industries to take on a 
global dimension, and moreover, due to relatively little technological rationalisation, it 
retained a low capital and comparably high labour intensity, with production being transferred 
to low-wage economies (see Preuss and Perschke, 2010).  
On the other hand, I added variation to the sample by choosing companies of different 
sizes within the SMEs range of less than 250 employees in order to detect possible intra-
group differences. As such, I have selected 4 companies that have only about 25 employees, 
one with about 100 employees, and three with 180 and more employees. In order to grasp the 
influence of collective action, I choose companies that participated in different industry 
associations or multistakeholder initiatives (e.g. the UNGC, the FWF or the Business Social 
Compliance Initiative, BSCI). The company names are anonymized for confidentiality 
reasons, which however has no effect on the analysis of results. 
The selected companies are illustrated in the following table 1: 
 
Company Name Number of 
Employees 
Key Product Persons  
interviewed 
Archival 
documents 
CPT AG 
(later CPT) 
20 promotion articles 1 COP, website 
Mammut Sports Group 
AG (Mammut) 
220 outdoor clothing 1 website 
Remei AG (Remei) 22 organic cotton 4 CSR report 
Sherpa Outdoor AG 
(Sherpa) 
100 outdoor clothing 2 website, audit sheet 
Stuco AG (Stuco) 14 (+106) safety clothing 2 website 
Switcher SA (Switcher) 180 fashion 2 CSR report 
Vestergaard Frandsen 
SA (Vestergaard) 
160 disease-control 
textiles 
1 CSR report 
 
Table 1: Interviewed companies. Source: own research, company websites.  
Note: Number of employees at the time of the first interview. 
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Data collection and case analysis method 
A total of 17 semi-structured interviews has been conducted, thereof 13 with company 
representatives. 4 additional interviews with external experts from government authorities and 
civil society organizations allowed further validation of results and data reliability. Interviews 
were conducted on-site and face-to-face at the companies’ headquarters in Switzerland 
between January and May 2010. The length of interviews varied between 30 minutes to 3 
hours, with an average of 90 minutes. The tape-recorded interviews where then transcribed 
into a case study analysis protocol, coded according to the dimensions of the conceptual 
framework and stored in a case-study database. I conducted a content analysis of interview 
transcripts by referencing within and across cases, sub-cases (if there were multiple 
interviews with one company), and with secondary data (see Yin, 2003). Data has also been 
coded by a second person to ensure inter-coder reliability. This parallel process of data 
collection, coding and analysis was conducted until I have been able to extract interesting and 
plausible findings from the data. For instance, I have identified a certain number of codes for 
one company which I attributed to the sub-dimension issue awareness. Then, I sorted these 
codes into the different stage-dimensions, e.g. in the civil or strategic stage. Within one 
dimension, it was not possible to sort all coded data of one company into the same stage-
dimension, as some answers e.g. demonstrated an awareness of issues which corresponded 
with the civil stage, and others rather with the strategic stage. Thus, for the purpose of this 
study, I considered it reasonable to take the highest average number of codes for one stage-
dimension to determine a company’s overall position in each respective dimensions. 
In order to increase reliability of data, I sought to interview more than one person per 
company, if applicable, and each having different job descriptions. To ensure high 
authenticity of the responses, I attempted not to interview PR-experts from the 
communications department, but interviewees which where either the owner-managers or 
managing directors of a company or not detached from the daily operations (this argument is 
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supported by a high consistency of primary data with secondary data obtained from third-
parties such as NGOs). All interviewees had other operational tasks apart from being 
responsible for a company’s CSR activities. 
In order to enhance the construct validity of the case study, I triangulated data, using 
multiple sources of evidence (see Miles and Huberman, 1984). I mainly referred to primary 
data (interviews) but used secondary data (archival company and third-party documents) to 
increase analytical rigor (see Gibbert et al., 2008). As such, I either cross-checked the 
statements of the interviewee by asking to provide written evidence for their statement, asking 
another interviewee in the same company the same questions, or double-checking the 
statements with external experts (e.g. if a company mentioned it was actively participating in 
a MSI, I approached that MSI for confirmation of the claim). For instance, I analyzed a 
survey about social responsibility among Swiss SMEs in the textile industry conducted by the 
Swiss NGO ‘Berne Declaration’ (see www.evb.ch) as well as multistakeholder-assessments 
conducted by the FWF. Where applicable, I analysed secondary data before actually 
conducting the interview to allow a refinement of questions for each individual company. All 
interview transcripts were also sent to the interviewees for review and to allow possible 
corrections. 
In keeping with the exploratory nature of this research, the precise content of the 
interview design was continually adjusted in an iterative process in order to explore emerging 
topics from previous interviews both of the same and of other companies. Whereas 
interviewees have been deliberately approached with an understanding that the focus of the 
study was social responsibility, it was emphasized that there were no ‘yes-or-no’ or ‘right-or-
wrong’ answers. Instead, interviewees were encouraged to enter a narrative mode of telling 
their story of how they interpret social responsibility in their company. In all cases, 
interviewees for instance came up with the ‘global dimension’ of their responsibility by 
themselves. Accordingly, the conceptual framework and the definitions of global governance 
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and political CSR mentioned earlier in this paper were not provided to the interviewees. This 
characteristic of qualitative research allowed minimizing ‘social desirability response effects’ 
that often occur and distort results in survey-based ethics research (Fernandez and Randall, 
1992; see also Crane, 1999). Individuals tend to deny socially undesirable traits and 
behaviours and purport socially responsible ones, especially when asked to do so in large-
scale surveys. While quantitative researchers must be very careful in wording instruments and 
analyzing results to diminish this effect, qualitative interviews to control this bias directly and 
rectify it during the course of the data collection. Rasche (2009) has therefore argued that in 
order to make evidence about the understanding and organizational implementation of 
political CSR more reliable, the existing quantitative survey-based data should be 
supplemented with detailed qualitative interview-based data. 
 
Results and Data Analysis 
Results of the case analysis, i.e. a company’s stage-position in a respective dimension suggest 
a relatively high consistency among the sample in the connection dimension (the majority of 
companies is in the civil stage) and a lower consistency in the power and skills & capacities 
dimensions (the majority of the companies is in the strategic stage). In the following, results 
are presented subsequently for each of the three dimensions connection, power and skills & 
capacities and their respective sub-categories to show in which of the stage-dimensions each 
of the 7 case-companies is situated. Results will be presented in an aggregated form; I 
reference quotations to highlight particular approaches of individual SMEs that illustrate the 
current stage of embeddedness of political CSR in a particular dimension.  
One company, namely Stuco, scored considerably lower than the remaining 
companies. This company had the least ‘exposure’ to and thus materiality of global 
governance issues, as it e.g. only produced in European countries. Accordingly, Stuco did not 
engage as much in political CSR activities as the other companies, but rather focuses on the 
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local level, which is not captured in the framework. Nevertheless, for clarity Stuco is still 
included in the illustration of results. 
Connection 
Results suggest that the companies are most advanced in the two sub-dimensions of the 
connection dimension. For issue-awareness, three companies demonstrated an awareness 
which can be attributed to the civil stage, three companies are attributed to the strategic, and 
only one company can be clearly situated in the managerial stage. The awareness of social 
connection along a company’s supply chain was distinctive in most cases, the majority being 
in the civil stage: All companies expressed that they are in principle to a smaller or larger 
degree connected to issues such as working conditions which occurred along their supply 
chains. Arrows indicate that a company is moving from one stage towards another one. 
Results of the connection dimension: 
Connection Denial  Compliance Managerial  Strategic Civil 
Issue 
Awareness 
- - 
Stuco→ Sherpa 
CPT→ 
Mammut 
Remei 
Switcher 
Vestergaard 
Social 
Connection  
- - 
Stuco CPT  
Mammut 
Sherpa 
Remei 
Switcher 
Vestergaard 
 
Table 2: Results of the commitment dimension. Source: own research 
 
Issue awareness:  
Remei, Vestergaard and Switcher showed an awareness of issues that goes beyond 
application of existing rules and regulation, and expressed an active engagement in rule-
making and problem solving beyond the immediate company boundaries: A Vestergaard 
representative exemplarily stated in this regard that ‘the first thing we take into consideration 
when we are developing new products is to look at the Millenium Development Goals. So, we 
identify a problem and then try to solve the problem with a product’, whereas a representative 
of Switcher emphasized that ‘the market for PET-recycling is still in its infancy. So we have 
to develop it’. For Switcher, it has always been the objective to be a leader in environmental 
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and social topics, i.e. to apply the highest possible production standard, and seek to spread it 
to the industry over time.  
Remei emphasized that it ‘wants to be environmentally and socially responsible from 
the growing of the plant to the final product we sell’. Due to its small size (less than 25 
employees) and without much hierarchy, it did not face much difficulty to integrate new 
issues ‘on the corporate radar’. Nevertheless, the representative stressed that the overall vision 
of the company was to a significant extent driven by the owner-managers and then trickled 
down to the mindsets of the employees. 
A representative of Mammut explained that the company uses ‘a framework that 
allows to take an integrated look at the CSR landscape, i.e. they do not want to say a product 
is environmentally friendly without answering how socially responsible it is’. This view 
clearly demonstrates an integrated, i.e. strategic understanding of issues, rather than being 
selective about a specific set of aspects. Mammut further divided its ‘CSR landscape’ into 
issues relevant to their core business processes and treated these as a key priority, next to 
establishing transparent management and disclosure. Philanthropic activities, which according 
to the Mammut representative ‘are where it all started’ still were seen as important, but with 
inferior priority compared to core business processes. 
CPT, who has formally committed itself to adhere to the 10 UNGC principles, stressed 
that for them it is also important to carry the message across, to their suppliers and to their 
customers, both for moral and for business reasons. For Sherpa, sustainable values are at the 
core of the company and its brand. One of the owner-managers illustrated Sherpa’s pragmatic 
approach: ‘Working conditions such as child labour are our first priority, then we look at 
environmental issues, which includes e.g. considering PET-recycling material for our 
products. Corruption is a total no-go. If we don’t take care here, we could just quit our 
business’. 
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Social connection: 
The majority of companies showed a proactive (strategic to civil) awareness of their social 
connection to global governance issues along their supply chains. None of the companies 
denied that it had any connection, i.e. responsibility, to issues that could occur along their (1st 
tier and beyond) supply chains.  
According to Switcher, such an attitude was often intrinsically motivated and evolved 
over time: ‘At the beginning it was about selling T-Shirts, but then we became aware of the 
bad situation of the workers in India, thinking “this can’t be like that” and that we should do 
something’. Hence, Switcher saw it as their role to motivate its suppliers and most 
importantly to give them advice how to approach a certain issue, e.g. more socially 
responsible production. Overall, the company wanted to be ‘responsible’ beginning with the 
social and environmental conditions at the cotton production sites (an upstream 
responsibility), for their employees and those of their suppliers, and for their customers to 
provide them with fairly produced products (a downstream responsibility). Similarly, Remei 
stressed that even smaller companies can have a high exposure and thus social connection to 
the living conditions of their suppliers’ workers. ‘We are a SME with some 20 employees, but 
if you include all the suppliers’ employees and their families, then we are talking about 
several thousand farmers. Hence, the responsibility is also apparent for a SME like us. Of 
course, we do not have the influence that a large company would have, but we have the 
benefit to be able to act quickly and directly’.  
A representative of CPT mentioned that ‘We know what’s going wrong and that we 
are connected to it, since we procure in these countries. So, we try to do what we can to 
improve the situation together with our peers’. For that reason, the company has developed a 
‘requirement sheet’ along the UNGC principles for its suppliers. Likewise, Sherpa, which also 
has developed its own ‘audit sheet’, reacted to a case where one of its suppliers was found out 
to also produce for the Burmese military by quitting business relationships with that supplier. 
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Mammut mentioned that within the range of issues to which the company is socially 
connected due to its supply chain, ‘the social issues are most pressing for us to take action, 
and there we also has the highest impact’. Stuco mentioned in this regard that even though it 
was well aware of the issues which might appear in emerging markets, they were not 
considered as material for them, as all their production was based in ‘well-regulated’ 
European countries.  
Power  
Results show that the interviewed SMEs are strongly engaged in collective action to jointly 
approach and solve global governance challenges. None of the companies used its small size 
and resources ‘as an excuse’ for not accepting a political responsibility. Rather, the companies 
stressed that due to their limited individual impact, the need to work together was even 
stronger. As such, most of the companies showed a strong engagement in networks, both at 
the industry level (e.g. industry associations, BSCI) and beyond, e.g. by participating in MSIs 
like the UNGC or the FWF. These networks are an important platform to spread awareness 
about rule-implementation and to also engage in collective rule-making, e.g. by setting 
industry standards. 
Results of the power dimension: 
Power Denial Compliance Managerial  Strategic Civil 
Collective 
Action 
- - 
Stuco CPT 
Mammut 
Sherpa 
Vestergaard 
Remei 
Switcher 
Network 
Involvement 
- - 
Sherpa 
Stuco 
CPT 
Mammut 
Vestergaard 
Remei 
Switcher 
 
Table 3: Results of the power dimension. Source: own research 
 
Collective action: 
According to Remei, the way companies and civil society have been cooperating has 
significantly changed over the last 20 years. The level of mutual trust is considerably higher 
and nowadays, Remei is much more able to talk about even controversial issues with some 
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(local) NGOs. In India, they are for instance working on a project to educate farmers. One of 
the owner-managers emphasized that for the initial development of their organic cotton 
production, it was essential to work collectively and directly with several partners. This 
included the farmers in the productions countries, which had to be trained about the 
advantages and disadvantages of organic cotton, their own employees, which needed a strong 
commitment, and also their large-scale buyer COOP.  
Switcher showed an example that even went beyond direct business interests by 
engaging in a project with the Swiss government to promote Labour Rights in China. Also, 
the company makes strong efforts to inform its suppliers about the implications of the FWF 
membership, e.g. by organizing meetings for social compliance officers. Switcher is 
furthermore engaged with local stakeholders in production countries to improve social 
dialogue on the factory level. Together with the FWF, Switcher is offering worker training at 
one of its suppliers. For instance, Switcher explained that it required a strong commitment and 
cooperation also towards their suppliers to ensure fair working conditions. In this sense, they 
ensured the supplier to stay even if it became more costly due to paying higher wages and for 
obtaining an SA8000 certification. 
Sherpa emphasized that the mere number of SMEs ‘out there’ can make a difference. 
‘Of course we (as an SME) can have an influence – voting-by-feet.’ This means that if a SME 
would have objections e.g. against the poor working conditions of one of its suppliers, it could 
simply quit relationships with that supplier. If all buyers of a supplier would do so, the 
representative of Sherpa stressed, it would most likely consider the buyer’s demands and 
improve working conditions.  
When asked how companies in their industry worked together, Mammut stressed that 
they understood ‘CSR as a global team sport and that due to small individual impact, they 
alone cannot solve all these topics.’ However, and similar to the responses of some of the 
other SMEs in this study, the representative of Mammut did not take that as an excuse for not 
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engaging, but highlighted that ‘it is why we cooperate within our industry’. Often, it simply 
needed economies of scale and commitment by several players to make a ‘sustainable activity 
profitable and thus attractive, e.g. for recycling of used garments. As such, ‘CSR needs to be 
understood as a business dimension of cooperation’. More specifically, CPT explained that 
they ‘work with our industry association, which is also a member of the UNGC. That way, we 
have much more power and can e.g. demand higher ethical standards among suppliers. It 
means rather small steps, but it works’.  
 
Network involvement: 
Switcher considered it important to meet and exchange ideas in several industry working 
groups with the large companies. The representative even highlighted that ‘some of the big 
players were quite jealous about the way we disclose our supply chain in the Internet. 
Switcher also participated actively in the FWF, as for them, this MSI incorporated the highest 
level regarding social and environmental standards, as e.g. compared to the business-driven 
BSCI. 
For Remei, it was important to focus on a network that fit the requirements of the 
company’s business and objectives. ‘There are many initiatives, BSCI, SAI, FWF, etc. We 
need to screen them and see what makes sense. One should not be in too many’. Similarly, 
CPT stressed that they are too small to pay for membership in all the initiatives out there’ 
even though participating might make good sense. They decided for the UNGC, because it is 
large and offers networking with others. However, during the course of this research, CPT 
decided to additionally join the FWF. 
On top, CPT showed that it was an active player in its industry association IPPAG, 
which is also a member of the UNGC. As such, CPT aimed to consolidate the aggregated 
influence of the many small players which were involved in that network. It allowed them to 
approach topics at a much higher level than alone. 
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Mammut stated that ‘they participate in the FWF because it is a multistakeholder-
initiative. BSCI is too business-driven and more for the big companies’. Moreover, Mammut 
demonstrated to be an active member in the outdoor-industry working-group by explaining 
several documents, such as meeting minutes or draft reporting, e.g. on the definition of 
industry standards. Stuco for instance explained that it joined the industry-driven BSCI 
because ‘our large customer recommended us to join, so we did’. 
Skills & Capacities 
The dimension skills & capacities comprises the four sub-dimensions company culture, daily 
practices, employee involvement and transparency. The results showed that responsibility in 
general and engagement in global governance was particularly strongly embedded in the 
company culture of the interviewed SMEs, often rather implicitly than explicitly. While the 
SMEs showed a good embeddedness of global governance practices in their daily business, 
the majority of the SMEs demonstrated a very strong involvement of their employees in 
shaping their respective agendas. Also, the SME cases illustrated that even small companies 
can be innovators for their entire industry in terms of disclosure and transparency. 
 
Results of the skills & capacities dimension: 
Skills & 
Capacities 
Denial Compliance Managerial  Strategic Civil 
Company 
Culture 
- - 
Stuco CPT 
Mammut 
Sherpa 
Remei 
Switcher 
Vestergaard 
Daily Practice 
& Processes 
- - 
Stuco→ CPT 
Mammut 
Sherpa 
Vestergaard 
Remei 
Switcher 
Employee 
Involvement 
- - 
Stuco CPT 
Sherpa 
Mammut 
Remei 
Switcher 
Vestergaard 
Transparency 
- - 
Stuco 
 
CPT 
Mammut 
Sherpa 
Vestergaard 
Remei 
Switcher 
 
Table 4: Results of the skills & capacities dimension. Source: own research 
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Company Culture: 
The results of this study suggest that SMEs have two distinct underlying motivations (see 
Ryan and Deci, 2000; Benabou and Tirole, 2003) that drives their behaviour. One represents 
an intrinsic motivation to engage in (political) responsibility, out of a strong conviction for 
ethical values and responsibility mainly driven by the owner-manager or founder (Spence and 
Lozano, 2000), and the other one being a more instrumentally driven extrinsic motivation, 
where CSR was seen as a management tool to create competitive advantage, i.e. the business 
case for CSR (see Jenkins, 2004). Notably, most of the SMEs in the sample did not see these 
motivations as mutually exclusive, but rather expressed that their engagement in (political) 
CSR was initially caused by one or the other kind of motivation, but then influenced by the 
respective other one. For instance, an SME in the sample would ‘start’ caring for working 
conditions along its supply chain out of conviction, and then seek to establish a business case 
over time to stay profitable, but it would not take the business case as a precondition to 
engage in one way or another. 
Furthermore, this study revealed that SMEs tend to have an advantage to adopt practices of 
political CSR due to their largely informal internal organization, which is more flexible to 
adapt to changing demands than that of MNEs. 
Intrinsic motivation: 
All the companies in the civil stage, Remei, Switcher and Vestergaard, emphasized that they 
aim to ‘optimize, not maximize’ their profits. There was a clear conviction that profitability is 
necessary to survive in competitive markets, but it was considerd difficult to reach social and 
environmental objectives when maximizing profits and thus taking only into account 
individual shareholder or equally narrow objectives. Switcher pointed this out by stating that 
‘we act out of conviction, not out of pure business logic. All this we could not do if we were 
maximizing profits’, while Remei added that ‘there should be a balance of what everyone gets 
from our sales: the farmers, the employees, the company. Furthermore, Remei made clear that 
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‘we would not do conventional cotton anymore, even though it might be more profitable’. 
These three SMEs suggested that for such an approach, it was necessary not to be subject to 
pressures of shareholders and more importantly capital markets, as exemplified by Remei: ‘It 
is part of sustainability to be profitable at some point in time. But as a private company, we 
can do something if we believe it’s the right thing’.  
Vestergaard stressed that ‘of course, we want to make a profit. But, if you are working 
with big donors, or the UN and NGOs, profit is not everything, as they have limited funds to 
spend, and there are millions of needy people in the world. This is how we look at the 
equation, how can we save the most lives with the smallest amount of money. As such, we 
believe that profit should be purpose-driven’. Vestergaard’s CEO highlighted in this way that 
‘profit is a key tool but not the ultimate goal. We are business-people, but this is not 
capitalism in its purest form. The profit is for a purpose!’ 
Along with this ownership dimension came the importance of the founders and owners 
of the respective SMEs to shape their stance towards responsibility and their corresponding 
company culture. For Switcher, it was ‘a huge difference whether a company is owner-
managed or publicly listed on the stock market. There, the distance between the board and the 
vision can be huge. At Switcher, our founder brought in the vision and lived it every day. 
Other decisions are possible, e.g. that we accept a smaller margin, but still decide to do a 
PET-recycled product or to use organic cotton, even though it might be less profitable’. 
Similarly, Sherpa stressed that ‘many SMEs are owner-managed. For us, this is a central 
aspect that sustainability issues are taken seriously, i.e. if you have an owner-manager who 
believes in it’. 
Extrinsic motivation: 
On the other hand, some SMEs such as Mammut or CPT, showed an approach which was 
predominantly business driven. As such, the underlying motivation came rather out of 
business logic than out of mere conviction. Mammut highlighted: ‘We are not a philanthropic 
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company, as we have expectations on turnover and profit. Thus we see CSR as a 
management-tool’ because ‘without margin, there is no mission, but without mission there is 
no margin. We need to balance this’. The representative of Mammut outlined that for them as 
a profit-oriented company, it is difficult to ‘reach all the points on the CSR scale’. Mammut 
can ‘absolutely reach an 80% level. However, reaching 100% does not work well if one has to 
maximize profits, as the last 20% would rather be nuances than strategy’. Thus, he considered 
that ‘profit-optimizing’ organizations, such as cooperatives, have a clear ‘advantage’ in this 
regard. CPT confirmed that ‘Yes, we do have a business logic. We offer an additional service 
that our products are ethical. But we are also proud that as a small company, we can change 
something’. 
Internal organization:  
The majority of the interviewed SMEs emphasized the significant differences in terms of their 
rather informal internal organization and its influence on their stance towards (political) 
responsibility. 
At Remei, ‘many things are informally organized. The personal relationship and 
communication are very important. In particular in India, we seek to have long-term supplier 
relationships for 10-20 years, in order to build trust. This has advantages and disadvantages, 
but we accept that’. According to the owner-manager of Remei, many decisions are taken 
intuitively. But as we grow and become deeper involved into different issues, we need to 
formalize our processes. This has significantly changed over the last 10 years’. 
Vestergaard highlighted that ‘SMEs tend to be more flexible and there is not such a 
big bureaucratic structure in place. Many SMEs might not be involved in some great 
initiatives, or they don’t have a glossy report with 50 pages to show afterwards. But there are 
small steps they can take; it’s just as important for an SME to take a small step as it is for a 
MNE to take a big step.’ For instance, Sherpa mentioned that ‘One should not focus just on 
having nice policies and not living them, which is often the case in big companies. This is 
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easier for SMEs. Better have no policy and good employees with high values, than a 
bombastic code that no-one knows’. Stuco added in this sense that ‘Large companies often 
have very nice brochures. SMEs tend to write less, but they are more authentic in what they 
do’. 
 
Daily Practices & Processes: 
In their daily practices and processes, most of the companies are situated in the strategic stage 
or even beyond, and demonstrated an array of both formal and informal approaches to 
integrate their commitment to policital CSR into their organizational procedures. 
According to Remei, in general ‘the advantage for SMEs is that they can act much 
quicker. We have shorter ways and are closer to the issue, and we can act out of conviction, 
rather than just due to profitability reasons. Also, we are much closer to reality than a large 
company’. Remei stressed that ‘going green’ is a challenge but still much easier for small 
companies than for large ones. While it took them already 10 years to become entirely organic 
in their cotton production, their flexibility as a small company has been critical. As Remei’s 
owner-manager highlighted, ‘if a large MNE would want to become entirely organic, they 
would most likely collapse. In addition, the market for organic cotton simply is not so large’. 
For Remei, it was crucial to have only as few suppliers as possible to maintain control about 
their social and environmental requirements. Nevertheless, they said that ‘as an SME, we aim 
to evoke the small changes, which become large over time’. Remei seeks to certify all its 
suppliers with the relatively comprehensive SA8000 standard. However, they would face 
serious difficulties if they required all suppliers to be certifiable right from the beginning. 
Thus, they ‘begin with the intermediate stage BSCI, which certainly is a lower standard. But, 
we need this to initiate a learning process that ultimately leads to SA8000’. 
Switcher has a clear objective to always apply the highest possible standard and to 
further its development over time. Next to social (e.g. SA8000) or environmental standards 
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(e.g. ökotex), the company found that they needed to improve on water management. With 
their recently launched water standard, they will for instance measure the individual water-
footprint for their products and disclose them to consumers, which according to the Switcher 
representative is still unique in their industry. 
With regards to the environment, CPT stated that they respond to customer demands 
by offering both ‘a recycling-line and regular products’. However, the company representative 
emphasized that in their general sourcing activities, they had ‘the UNGC principles as a basis 
of our requirement sheet.’ This sheet also included e.g. CE, ISO and SA standards (both 
voluntary and legally required standards). 
While Mammut stated that in their business conduct, the company ‘looks at price and 
quality in the same way as they look at environmental and social issues’ they had the goal to 
increase the percentage of FWF-certified supplier factories from 77% to 100% in the near 
future. Also, the company wants to increase the bluesign (an environmental standard) 
approved materials, which was at 44% at the time of the interview. Notwithstanding, the 
company stressed that this is a process which cannot be achieved over night, but required 
continuous engagement with the suppliers. For instance, the willingness to increase working 
standards is most likely higher among European retailers than among Chinese suppliers. 
Moreover, Mammut seeks to conduct a life-cycle assessment for its products along the entire 
value-chain, including consumers. They analyse where the product has the highest impact, 
e.g. in terms of carbon-footprint, and then select their largest lever to improve a specific part 
of the life-cycle. Within the industry-working group where Mammut is participating, the 
company is responsible for ‘end-of-life’ issues, i.e. recycling of used garments, which can 
later be reused to produce new garments. 
 
 
 
 31 
Employee Involvement:  
Mammut demonstrated a particularly innovative way to ‘get the CSR-message across’, as the 
company had installed so-called CSR-agents in every of its divisions. These employees were 
‘always supposed to wear the green hat of CSR, ask critical questions and bring the message 
to everyone’s mindset’. According to Mammut, this strategy has been working very well and 
an understanding for CSR in general and issues related to the global level (i.e. supply chain 
relations and global governance) are strongly represented among employees. As such, at 
Mammut ‘ideas evolve top-down as well as bottom-up. Everyone, the CEO and the 
employees, has a high affinity to the environment. If glaciers are melting, so does our core 
business’. In a similar vein, Switcher emphasized that ‘it needs personal involvement of every 
employee. They need to know why it’s important what they are doing every day so they can 
carry the message’. 
Vestergaard also had quite an intense way of ‘getting the message’ to its employees. 
As the company stated, they ‘send all their employees to the field to actually do work there, 
so they have an impression of what’s going on in Africa. We consider this very important for 
our employees’ motivation’. Similarly, Remei encouraged its employees to do field visits at 
their cotton production sites in Africa. 
CPT stated that as a very small company, it was not so difficult to spread awareness 
among employees. Their requirement-sheet, which was an internal document based on the 
UNGC principles and used when checking suppliers was for most processes circulated among 
almost every employee (i.e. from initial salesperson to logistics, marketing, procurement, 
management, etc.), as the representative stated: ‘All employees know that (sheet), and we are 
so small that most people are involved in almost every process anyway’. A Sherpa 
representative confirmed this by adding that ‘in terms of employee motivation and 
identification with the job, I think SMEs have an advantage, as everyone is in closer contact 
to each other and to the issues the company is dealing with’. However, as Switcher 
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mentioned, SMEs need to become more formalized as they grow: ‘Take employee training, 
which we have about CSR for new employees. If we do that well, it’s no problem, but as we 
grow, we need to do this more carefully’. 
 
Transparency:  
While some companies applied and promoted an approach to transparency which was clearly 
beyond common industry standards (see the companies in the civil stage), others referred to 
their status as a private company which did not have legal requirements for disclosing 
information. Nevertheless, those two SMEs (Remei, Switcher) which showed the highest 
level of transparency said they initially did so out of conviction, but clearly communicated 
this to their consumers for strategic reasons.  
Remei for instance considered transparency a competitive advantage. The owner-
manager emphasized that ‘organic alone is not a unique-selling-proposition anymore. But to 
ensure and disclose social and environmental sustainability along the entire value chain, 
traceable, fair traded, and independently audited is a product promise which only few other 
can hold’. Remei has a traceability number for all their products which allows precise 
tracking of the production chain. The owner-manager stressed that ‘if you are transparent, you 
always decide for the benefit of society. If I am able to transparently disclose all my 
information, I had to make sure it was the best solution. If I have a bad solution, I need to 
reduce transparency, otherwise others will criticise’. 
Switcher approached transparency in a proactive and pragmatic way. One 
representative noted that ‘we are looking for NGO input when we talk about transparency. 
We see it as a strategic move to disclose everything what we do. We invite everyone to see 
what we do’. For Switcher, it was the objective to ‘be transparent in a way that everyone can 
trace our products from the cotton plant to the store hanger’. The requirements for 
transparency and the respective underlying social and environmental demands where firmly 
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embedded in the company’s activities, which was confirmed by several studies of 
independent NGOs, such as FWF or EvB. Switcher stressed that ‘for example, my colleague 
from production wants to produce a jacket, but there is only one factory in the world which 
can do that. It might be that we say no, if it’s not clear under which conditions this jacket can 
be produced, or if it is not transparent enough regarding our social and environmental 
demands’. 
Mammut demonstrated that the topic of transparency in their supply chain was of 
increasing importance for the company, also due to consumer demands and industry 
standards. Hence, the company committed to report according to the GRI framework from 
2010 on. Mammut also joined the FWF in 2008 and agreed to do an annual social report about 
working conditions in its supply chain. As the Mammut representative stressed the high 
expectation of this MSI and the respective auditing by stating that ‘the FWF people are 
extreme. We sort of bought the Rolls-Royce of the auditors. If we stand their audits, we are 
really good!’  
Vestergaard approached the issue of transparency quite differently from Remei or 
Switcher: A company representative stated that ‘we don’t have product DNA or such a thing 
directly, as we don’t have so much contact with the everyday-customer. 90% of the people 
that use our products don’t know how to read or have a computer. However, our NGO 
partners, the UN, etc. all have very high standards for what they buy. They are able to audit 
our partner-factories at any time. We do have regular visits to our factories by certain donors 
or certain government officials’. Very similar to the other companies, Vestergaard highlighted 
that ‘in the optimal situation, you have very few suppliers, and you have very good working 
relations with them, you monitor them closely, etc. But for VF, we don’t have a lot anyway, 
since we don’t make a lot of different products’. 
Sherpa showed an approach to transparency which was quite differently from 
mainstream practice, but provided credible arguments why this was not necessarily inferior. 
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The company wants to do the audits by themselves and has therefore developed its own audit-
sheet, which was inspired by own hands-on experiences and used for the audits of their 
supplier’s factories. It includes straightforward issues like hygiene, temperatures in the 
factory, but also wages. To make sure it is being followed, Sherpa’s founder said that ‘I just 
go to the workers and talk to them. A third-party can do it as well, but we only have certainty 
if we go into the factories by ourselves.’ That’s why Sherpa, similar to the other SMEs, is 
trying to keep the number of suppliers low and thus under better control. Hence, it ‘reduced 
the suppliers to three factories. Thus, we have better control, and we personally know the 
people in the factories, and also can just walk in whenever we want and check the situation. 
Furthermore, we have stopped producing in another factory where we did not have the full 
control’. 
In sum, findings suggest that political CSR is not something just for large companies 
and that some SMEs are even ‘more advanced’ in global governance than MNEs (see 
Baumann & Scherer, 2010) (see appendix 2 for aggregated results table). 
1. Within the sample, there is no evidence that SMEs feel overburdened by the global 
governance agenda. Rather, the interviewed SMEs seemed to be very flexible to adapt to 
dynamic challenges and they provided innovative approaches. 
2. None of the SMEs in the sample stated that their inferior financial or human resources 
were a reason for not actively engaging in global governance. As such, it should not be 
assumed that political CSR and global governance is only ‘something for the big 
companies’.  
3. Given the practices of the SMEs, in particular those in the civil and strategic stage, it 
seems wrong to predominantly consider MNEs for best-practices and as the innovators in 
the CSR debate. Rather, MNEs should pay more attention for SME best practices, for 
instance regarding employee involvement or transparency. 
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4. Given the high willingness of SMEs to engage collectively, it seems inappropriate to 
assume that to have an impact, one should only approach MNEs. At an aggregated level, 
SMEs might as well have a considerable impact, e.g. on supplier behaviour.  
 
Discussion 
Results as illustrated above provide systematic empirical evidence that in principle, a political 
role in global governance exists for SMEs, as much as has been empirically shown for MNEs 
(Baumann & Scherer, 2010; see also Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). Several SMEs are proactively 
engaging in issues along their supply chain activities in zones of weak governance or social 
and environmental regulation. These SMEs engage in specific (managerial stage) and 
integrated (strategic stage) rule-implementation and even in joint rule-making (civil stage) on 
a global scale. 
I develop several propositions from the analysis of the results. Even though these 
propositions are not to be generalized to ‘the SME’ as such, they are relevant for SMEs which 
are embedded in global supply chains (most of all in the textile industry). Furthermore, I 
suggest that these propositions guide future research and form the basis of subsequent 
quantitative scrutiny. 
Overall, the interviewed SMEs have demonstrated high awareness for the existance of 
global governance issues and a high level of perceived social connection to the raised 
problems in their supply chains. I conclude from the results that initial awareness and (formal 
or informal) commitment to engage in global governance does not depend on size or resource 
configuration, but rather on the industry and the resulting exposure to the global governance 
thematic itself (see also Spence, 1999). The results support this claim as the company which 
had the least exposure to global governance issues and its supply chain largely based in 
Europe, namely Stuco, scored lowest in all categories; although, Stuco had a similar size and 
resource configuration than the other companies in the sample.  
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In the sample, lacking financial or human resources was not considered a significant 
constraint to implement practices of political CSR in the daily operations. Rather, the 
interviewed SMEs had a wide array of practices in place, which where either semi-formal and 
self-developed (requirement sheets for suppliers or own audit checklists) or relied on 
established formal certification schemes like SA8000, ISO14001 or a FWF management 
system audit. Results furthermore showed that there is a relatively high consistency between 
the issues a company demonstrated to be aware of and considered to be socially connected to 
and the actual practices which were in place at that company. I deduct the following 
proposition from this discussion: 
 
• Proposition 1: Size and resource configuration are not the dominating 
factors to determine more or less advanced (political) CSR engagement; 
rather do industry and embeddedness in global supply chains.  
 
Regarding the motivation of SMEs in the sample to engage in global governance and 
political CSR, instrumental reasons, such as the search for a business case, appeared to be less 
important than ethical reasons that are largely influenced by the founders and owner-
managers of a firm (see also Jenkins, 2004). The motivation of SMEs, manifested in the 
company culture, was predominantly driven by intrinsic reasons, i.e. engaging out of 
conviction, and less because of strategic or business reasons. All of the SMEs in the sample 
nevertheless sought to establish a business case for their engagement and considered strategic 
reasons for their activities, but this was only for a minority of the companies dominating over 
conviction and individual ethical beliefs. The most advanced companies in this sample 
demonstrated a view on the role of business in society which is different from mainstream 
economic theories and instrumental approaches to CSR which seek to establish a relationship 
between CSR and financial performance as a precondition to engage in some sort of social 
activities (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Scherer and Palazzo, 2007). Accordingly, some of the 
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SMEs did not agree or even thought it is ‘the wrong way’ to always aim to maximize profits 
for a limited number of individuals. While everyone agreed on the obvious need to be 
profitable to stay in business, it was emphasized that this could be achieved with an 
‘optimization’ and equal distribution of profits among those who contributed to their creation. 
I deduct the following proposition from this discussion: 
 
• Proposition 2: Owner-managed SMEs are more likely to engage in political 
CSR out of conviction and do not see the business case for CSR as a 
precondition to act responsibly. 
 
Ownership structure appeared to be an important determinant for how far a company 
is willing to go in its political CSR engagement (see also Berrone et al., 2010), as exemplified 
by Mammut and Remei. Companies which are subject to maximization of profits tend to see 
(political) CSR as a strategic management tool and would thus invest in an ‘optimal level’ of 
CSR (see Baron, 2001; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Husted and Salazar, 2006) as long as it 
maximizes to their profitability. Companies which are not subject to maximization, but rather 
optimization of profits, as Remei or Switcher, are for instance able to spend comparably more 
on fair wages (i.e., above minimum wage to ensure a decent standard of living) or 
environmentally friendly materials (e.g., organic or PET-recycled), because their conviction 
tells them to do so. They can ‘afford’ to be in the civil stage, even though the strategic stage 
might be more advantageous for their profitability. Contrary to commonly raised claims about 
the need for CSR activities to increase a firm’s financial performance (see Campbell, 2007; 
McWilliams et al., 2006), such firms seem to give priority to increase societal benefits before 
they increase their own economic performance. An ‘optimal level’ of CSR would thus be 
interpreted as optimal for solving societal problems, rather than optimal for solving a firm’s 
profit maximization problems. 
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Supported by the results, I argue that an instrumental orientation for CSR is not as 
dominating among many owner-managed SMEs in particular, as compared to the majority of 
MNEs (see also Jenkins, 2006; Spence and Rutherfoord, 2003). This constitutes an 
advantageous precondition for SMEs to engage in political CSR. While many forms of 
‘business-centric’ strategic CSR concepts (McWilliams et al., 2006; Porter & Kramer, 2006) 
are aimed to increase a company’s long-term competitive advantage, it remains unclear how 
an ideal type of the rather ‘society-centric’ political CSR does so. Instrumental motives to 
engage in political CSR have not yet been thoroughly developed in the literature, however, 
instrumental benefits remain expected to justify a company’s CSR engagement towards 
influential stakeholders such as shareholders. While it has been argued that MNEs which 
engage in political CSR can reduce the probability for instance of boycotts or NGO criticism 
that e.g. harms their reputation (see Scherer and Palazzo, 2007), actual knowledge about the 
effects on company performance remain humble (Margolis & Walsh, 2003). For SMEs that 
are subject to significantly less media attention and public visibility, this argument would be 
even weaker (see Tilley, 2000). Hence, while it remains difficult to encourage MNEs to 
engage in political CSR for mere instrumental or strategic reasons, I suggest that this is not 
even necessary for SMEs. Conviction and ethical values play a major role in guiding SME’s 
activities and benefits to society can have a comparably larger influence on a SME’s 
conviction than the unclear business benefits. I deduct the following proposition from this 
discussion: 
 
• Proposition 3: Companies which are not subject to shareholder pressure or 
profit maximization are likely to be more advanced in political CSR. 
 
Results suggst that smaller companies with little hierarchy and organizational 
complexity seem to have an advantage compared to MNEs to spread awareness and involve 
employees in their global governance engagement (see also Dean et al., 1998), as a) it is more 
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likely that individual employees are dealing with one or another respective issue in their daily 
business (see Jenkins, 2004); b) it is easy for the owner-manager to spread the message and 
his conviction, for instance just via simple ‘management-by-walking-around’ (see Waldman 
and Yammarino, 1999); and c) employees are likely to feel more personally connected to 
what the company is doing (see e.g. Spence and Lozano, 2000). In addition, small company 
size and a corresponding flexibility in organizational structures seems to be an advantage to 
detect and spread issues within the company, both top-down from management to employees 
and bottom-up from employees to management (see also Russo and Tencati, 2009; Spence 
and Lozano, 2000). I deduct the following proposition from this discussion: 
 
• Proposition 4: Small companies committed to engage in global governance 
have higher employee awareness of respective issues than large companies. 
 
The willingness to engage in collective action, both with peer companies and civil 
society actors is highly represented among the sample. Most of the SMEs in the sample are 
actively involved in MSIs, such as the UNGC or the FWF, or industry associations like BSCI 
or specific industry working groups. The argument of being small and having limited 
resources and thus impact has not been used as an excuse for ‘not doing anything’. Rather, 
small size is considered a reason why combining individual limited impact with other actors 
and engage in collective action is a necessary condition to have an impact. Also, there has 
been no evidence raised by the argumentation of the sample SMEs that in collective efforts 
‘where everybody is responsible, no one really feels responsible’ (Bandura, 2002, p. 107). 
Interviewees have acknowledged their connection to issues and have also stated that larger 
companies tend to have more responsibility, not due to stronger connection but due to 
stronger power. However, limited power, resources and knowledge have been used as an 
argument why it is necessary for SMEs to engage and share their approaches with others, such 
as partners along the supply chain. I deduct the following proposition from this discussion: 
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• Proposition 5: Smaller size and low individual impact imply higher 
willingness to engage in collective action and to share experiences and best-
practices with others. 
 
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
There are several limitations which accompany this study. Due to the explorative character 
and the case study nature of a very small sample size, the findings are not directly 
generalizable to the wider SME sector. Rather, they were aimed to provide an in-depth 
understanding of SMEs motivations, triggers and characteristics of their global governance 
engagement. However, the findings allow a much more comprehensive generation of 
propositions which qualify for upcoming quantitative study, e.g. by conducting a large scale 
survey among SMEs of different sectors or cultural contexts. 
Furthermore, due to the theoretical sampling and the intention to study ‘rich cases’, 
results might be biased in a way that they provide evidence from best-in-class companies, 
which are already far ahead of the mainstream approaches of peer companies. Also, I 
analyzed an industry with a high initial exposure and also high customer sensitivity to global 
governance issues, namely the textile industry and for instance the apparent concern about 
working condition or high environmental sensitivity among customers of outdoor-brands. As 
such, political CSR was already a relatively well established concept among those companies 
and all had collected experience over several years. Some of the SMEs can be considered as 
having a ‘responsible product’ by definition, e.g. when producing mosquito-nets or organic 
fair trade cotton; however, as the results suggest, there is no tendency that companies with 
‘normal’ products would score significantly lower. Also, all SMEs are from Switzerland, 
which might also have had an influence on their behaviour, as e.g. compared to SMEs from 
an emerging market context. While results suggested that the participation in a MSI is 
beneficial for SME’s engagement in political CSR, in particular regarding their collective 
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efforts, I have not been able to deduct from the results whether specific MSIs like the FWF or 
more broad MSIs like the UNGC are considered more or less beneficial. 
I therefore propose that future research based on the propositions which have been 
developed should focus on gathering data from a more representative and larger sample, to 
find generalizable support for the role of SMEs in global governance. Findings could then be 
translated into more robust policy and management recommendations. Also, the framework 
and the propositions could be applied in different industries (e.g. cocoa or coffee, travel, or an 
industry with low global governance exposure) and in different cultural backgrounds (e.g. 
comparing a European to a US to an emerging market approach), which have been argued to 
influence CSR behaviour (see e.g. Matten and Moon, 2008; Palazzo, 2002). 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have conducted a case study among a sample of 7 Swiss SMEs in the textile 
industry in order to illustrate with systematically derived empirical evidence that a political 
role in global governance exists for SMEs as much as being proposed for MNEs (see 
Baumann and Scherer, 2010).  
A two-dimensional conceptual framework formed the underlying theoretical 
background for the analysis. Results suggest that the SMEs in the sample are well aware of 
global governance issues along their supply chains and express a high willingness to engage 
in collective action in order to increase their small individual impact. Small company size has 
also been considered an advantage to spread awareness about global governance issues among 
employees. I have highlighted several factors that facilitate rather than hinder SMEs to engage 
in political CSR. Compared to MNEs, in particular owner-managed SMEs tend to act out of 
conviction (intrinsic motivation), they are more flexibility in adapting to new issues, and they 
share best practices with peers.  
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This study contributes to the existing literature by adding insights about the role of 
SMEs in global governance, a still largely unexplored field. I have sought to use this 
explorative study to establish theoretical propositions which I suggest to be studied in further 
quantitative survey-based analyses. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Global Governance Assessment Tool for SMEs 
Stages/ 
Dimensions 
Denial 
no political 
responsibility 
Compliance 
no political 
responsibility 
Managerial 
selective rule-
implementation 
Strategic 
integrated rule-
implementation 
Civil 
rule-making and rule-
implementation 
Connection 
Issue-
Awareness 
- not aware of 
issues related to 
global 
governance 
 
- know national laws 
and regulation and 
respect them 
 
- aware of global 
governance 
challenges and own 
impact on specific 
issues/processes 
within value chain 
- aware of global 
governance 
challenges and own 
impact on all 
issues/processes  
 
- awareness of internal and 
external, societal problems 
at large 
- proactive raising of 
awareness of other actors, 
e.g., suppliers, sector 
peers  
Social-
Connection  
- don’t feel 
connected  
- liability logic 
- accept direct 
connection, if 
established by law 
- liability logic  
- focus on social 
connection that has 
impact on specific 
processes 
- selective approach 
along supply chain 
- aware that social 
connection exists 
along entire supply 
chain 
- integrated approach 
along entire supply 
chain 
- aware of indirect 
connection along entire 
supply chain 
- accept impact on direct 
and indirect stakeholders 
- promote awareness of 
impact among peers 
Power 
Collective 
Action 
- no collective 
action  
 
- reactive 
engagement  
- not self-motivated 
- join, if it makes 
business sense, on 
specific processes 
and issues 
- join for strategic 
reasons, covers entire 
business; 
strategic/long-term 
partnerships 
- focus on rule-
implementation  
- rule-making and rule-
implementation 
- promote awareness and 
joint efforts with 
suppliers, buyers and 
peers 
-joint/collective action 
AND decision making 
with involved actors 
Network 
Involvement 
- no network 
involvement  
- no priority 
- occasional 
involvement/ad-hoc 
- passive 
- low priority 
 
- participate in net-
work, but as follower 
- medium priority 
-engage in selected 
projects 
- emphasize 
business/strategic 
benefits from 
participation 
- high priority 
- active, leadership role, 
continuous involvement 
- want to be best practice 
example 
- encourage others to join 
Skills & Capacities 
Company 
Culture 
- not part of 
culture 
 
- compliance culture 
(know and respect 
the law) 
- philanthropy 
- consider specific 
processes, e.g., via 
certificates 
- CSR seen as 
investment, but ad-
hoc decision  
- competitive 
advantage with 
sustainable products 
- integrated 
institutionalization 
- contribute to a better 
society at large  
- achieve leadership role 
- culture of open 
communication and joint 
decision, open feedback 
Daily Practice 
& Processes 
- not part of 
daily business 
practice 
- try to escape 
existing rules 
- minimum 
- implement rules 
where obliged to by 
law 
- only for specific 
processes 
- focus on (voluntary) 
rule-implementation 
- use of (formal) 
management systems, 
labels, certification 
-embedded in entire 
business strategy and 
processes 
- promote in all parts of 
value creation 
- promotion in supplier 
practices 
- willing to transfer own 
best-practice to others 
Employee 
Involvement 
- not in 
employee 
mindset 
- passive, know laws - selective, e.g., 
procurement officer 
- all employees 
(management) are 
involved and 
responsible for rule-
implementation 
- political responsibility 
part of employee mindset 
- active involvement of 
employees in rule- and 
decision making 
- management and 
employee driven 
Transparency - no 
transparency, no 
information is 
disclosed 
- transparency is kept 
at minimum level, if 
disclosed only on 
request or if legally 
required 
- good practice is 
disclosed  
- use of 
label/certification for 
specific products 
- all operations/entire 
value chain is 
disclosed 
- all products have 
labels or are certified 
- transparency is actively 
promoted 
- stakeholder feedback is 
integrated in decisions 
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Appendix 2: Aggregated Results Table: 
Connection Denial Compliance Managerial  Strategic Civil 
Issue 
Awareness 
- - 
Stuco→ Sherpa 
CPT→ 
Mammut 
Remei 
Switcher 
Vestergaard 
Social 
Connection  
- - 
Stuco CPT  
Mammut 
Sherpa 
Remei 
Switcher 
Vestergaard 
Power Denial Compliance Managerial  Strategic Civil 
Collective 
Action 
- - 
Stuco CPT 
Mammut 
Sherpa 
Vestergaard 
Remei 
Switcher 
Network 
Involvement 
- - 
Sherpa 
Stuco 
CPT 
Mammut 
Vestergaard 
Remei 
Switcher 
Skills & 
Capacities 
Denial Compliance Managerial  Strategic Civil 
Company 
Culture 
- - 
Stuco CPT 
Mammut 
Sherpa 
Remei 
Switcher 
Vestergaard 
Daily Practice 
& Processes 
- - 
Stuco→ CPT 
Mammut 
Sherpa 
Vestergaard 
Remei 
Switcher 
Employee 
Involvement 
- - 
Stuco CPT 
Sherpa 
Mammut 
Remei 
Switcher 
Vestergaard 
Transparency 
- - 
Stuco 
 
CPT 
Mammut 
Sherpa 
Vestergaard 
Remei 
Switcher 
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